
Dark Patterns at Scale

Findings from a Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites


Arunesh Mathur

Joint work with: Gunes Acar, Michael Friedman, Elena Lucherini, Jonathan Mayer, Marshini Chetty, Arvind Narayanan





Enjoy all this FREE for the next 30 days and only \$12 per month thereafter...



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\$8 million settlement with the New York State Attorney General



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"


Dark patterns are user interface design choices that benefit an online service by coercing, steering, or deceiving users into making decisions that — if fully informed and capable of selecting alternatives — they might not make.

Instagram Ad




Not a real strand of hair

Facebook Consent




Facebook Consent



3 clicks to provide consent 14 clicks to revoke consent

How can we identify and measure dark patterns on the web at scale?




Why Measurement?

- 1. Document a wide variety of dark patterns
- 2. Measurement can be the basis of building defenses
- 3. Companies respond to public pressure; precedents include privacy & security measurement studies

Our study: Shopping Websites

- 1. Several anecdotes of dark patterns
- 2. Analyzed a corpus of 11K of the most popular shopping websites worldwide




Contributions

- 1. Developed automated techniques to help experts identify dark patterns on the web at scale
- 2. Created a data set of 1,818 dark patterns on 1,254 shopping websites (~11.1%)
- 3. Documented the third-party entities that enable dark patterns on websites
- 4. Created a descriptive taxonomy that characterizes how dark patterns work


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
Method: Three Key Steps




Mimicking a real user browsing websites




Collecting and storing data from websites





Method: Three Key Steps
































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





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




Page Segments



Page Segments



★★★★★ <u>76 Reviews</u>

Page Segments


Size: Please select | Size Chart

6.5M 9.5M

ADD TO BAG


Qty: **1**

- HTML Sources
- HAR files
- Screenshots
- HTTP Requests
- HTTP Responses




★★★★★ <u>76 Reviews</u>

Method: Three Key Steps









Method: Three Key Steps







Clustering Segments



Examine clusters for dark patterns

Result: 15 Types, 7 Categories

Sneaking

- 1. Sneak into Basket
- 2. Hidden Costs
- 3. Hidden Subscription

Urgency

- 1. Countdown Timer
- 2. Limited-time Message

Scarcity

- 1. Low-stock Message
- 2. High-demand Message

Misdirection

- 1. Confirmshaming
- 2. Visual Interference
- 3. Trick Questions
- 4. Pressured Selling

Social Proof

- 1. Activity Messages
- 2. Testimonials of Uncertain Origin

Obstruction

1. Hard to Cancel

Forced Action

1. Forced Enrollment

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
Obstruction


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
DP #1: Urgency — Timers






393 instances (157 deceptive)


DP #2: Sneaking — Sneak into Basket






7 instances


DP #3: Sneaking — Hidden Subscription






14 instances

DP #4: Social Proof — Activity Notification




313 instances (29 deceptive)

DP #4: Social Proof — Activity Notification




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
DP #5: Misdirection — Visual Interference



Code, Data, and More Examples




webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/dark-patterns



Future Research

- 1. Conduct longitudinal measurements of the prevalence of dark patterns on the web
- 2. Study the effect of interventions (e.g., reporting about websites' dark patterns) on prevalence
- 3. Gather users' perceptions of the types of dark patterns, and examine the effect of dark patterns on user behavior
- 4. Study the design process: how do dark patterns emerge?

Technical Solutions



Browser extension to alert users about dark patterns, or block third-parties that enable dark patterns

Legal Solutions

- Many deceptive dark patterns violate Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act
- 2. "Sneaking" dark patterns violate the Consumer Rights Directive in the UK
- Industry specific rules in the United States: Funeral Rule, Used Car Rule
- Many consent dark patterns do not constitute informed and freely given consent under General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

Policy Proposals



Proposed Deceptive Experiences
To Online Users Reduction
(DETOUR) act reins in more broadly
against design that "obscures,
subverts, or impairs user autonomy
and decision-making".

- Developed automated techniques to help experts identify dark patterns on the web at scale
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